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Locke	  on	  Territorial	  Rights	  
Bas	  van	  der	  Vossen	  
Philosophy,	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Greensboro	  
(published	  in	  Political	  Studies)	  
	  
Abstract:	  Most	  treatments	  of	  territorial	  rights	  include	  a	  discussion	  (and	  rejection)	  of	  Locke.	  
There	  is	  a	  remarkable	  consensus	  about	  what	  Locke’s	  views	  were.	  For	  him,	  states	  obtain	  
territorial	  rights	  as	  the	  result	  of	  partial	  transfers	  of	  people’s	  property	  rights.	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  
reject	  this	  reading.	  I	  argue	  that	  (a)	  for	  Locke,	  transfers	  of	  property	  rights	  were	  neither	  
necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  territorial	  rights	  and	  that	  (b)	  Locke	  in	  fact	  held	  a	  two-­‐part	  
theory	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  I	  support	  this	  reading	  by	  appealing	  to	  textual	  and	  contextual	  




States	  exercise	  political	  power	  over	  the	  areas	  they	  claim	  as	  their	  territories.	  When	  
they	  do	  so	  legitimately,	  states	  possess	  territorial	  rights.	  At	  its	  core,	  a	  state’s	  
territorial	  right	  is	  its	  right	  to	  have	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  certain	  geographical	  area.	  If	  a	  
state	  has	  territorial	  rights,	  then	  people	  can	  become	  subject	  to	  its	  legitimate	  
authority	  by	  being	  present	  in	  the	  geographical	  area	  over	  which	  it	  governs.	  
	   Most	  treatments	  of	  territorial	  rights	  include	  a	  discussion	  of	  John	  Locke.	  Locke	  
stands	  out	  as	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  political	  thinkers	  devoting	  attention,	  however	  
briefly,	  to	  this	  topic.	  There	  is	  remarkable	  agreement	  on	  what	  his	  views	  were.	  For	  
Locke,	  it	  is	  said,	  states	  obtain	  territorial	  rights	  by	  means	  of	  individual	  acts	  of	  
property	  submission	  by	  their	  subjects.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  political	  consent	  people	  
transfer	  to	  the	  state	  a	  small	  part	  of	  their	  property	  right.	  This	  gives	  the	  state	  the	  right	  
to	  demand	  allegiance	  of	  anyone	  who	  might	  subsequently	  enter	  the	  property.	  
Entering	  submitted	  property	  is,	  to	  use	  Locke’s	  phrase,	  to	  consent	  tacitly	  to	  the	  
state’s	  authority.	  	  
	   This	  view	  is	  idiosyncratic.	  Many	  now	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  categorical	  
distinction	  between	  the	  rights	  of	  states	  to	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  
to	  property.1	  And	  Locke’s	  theory	  of	  territory	  is	  often	  mentioned	  only	  to	  be	  
summarily	  rejected,	  so	  as	  to	  indicate	  the	  need	  for	  an	  alternative	  approach.	  I	  believe	  
that	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Locke	  is	  mistaken.	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  Locke	  did	  not	  see	  
territorial	  rights	  as	  based	  in	  property.	  Instead,	  his	  approach	  is	  considerably	  more	  
complex,	  and	  more	  modern,	  than	  is	  now	  realized.	  Moreover,	  Locke’s	  views	  contain	  
an	  important	  lesson	  about	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  discussions	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  Thus,	  
while	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  article	  is	  primarily	  historical,	  my	  findings	  are	  relevant	  to	  
contemporary	  debates	  as	  well.	  
	   On	  the	  reading	  of	  Locke	  I	  propose,	  there	  are	  two	  elements	  to	  how	  territorial	  
rights	  are	  obtained.	  Internally,	  a	  state	  gains	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  over	  the	  people	  in	  its	  
territory	  by	  being	  the	  first	  to	  exercise	  justified	  political	  power	  within	  an	  area.	  When	  
people	  remain	  in	  this	  area	  they	  give	  the	  state	  their	  tacit	  consent.	  Thus,	  for	  Locke,	  
tacit	  consent	  can	  justify	  not	  only	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  state	  that	  already	  has	  territorial	  
rights,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  justify	  those	  territorial	  rights	  themselves.	  Externally,	  a	  state	  
gains	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  exercise	  such	  political	  power	  within	  its	  territory	  by	  
securing	  the	  agreement	  of	  other	  states	  not	  to	  engage	  in	  competitive	  exercises	  of	  
political	  power.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  international	  treaties.	  Before	  defending	  
this	  reading,	  a	  word	  about	  territorial	  rights	  is	  required.	  There	  is	  some	  dispute	  about	  
how	  to	  understand	  these	  rights.	  Some	  adopt	  extensive	  definitions.	  A.	  John	  Simmons,	  
the	  most	  prominent	  defender	  of	  the	  reading	  of	  Locke	  that	  I	  will	  challenge,	  defines	  
territorial	  rights	  as	  a	  complex	  bundle	  of	  claims,	  including:	  
(1)	  rights	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  (either	  full	  or	  partial)	  over	  those	  within	  the	  
territory,	  and	  so	  to	  control	  and	  coerce	  in	  substantial	  ways	  even	  non-­‐citizens	  
within	  it;	  (2)	  rights	  to	  reasonably	  full	  control	  over	  land	  and	  resources	  within	  
the	  territory	  that	  are	  not	  privately	  owned;	  (3)	  rights	  to	  tax	  and	  regulate	  uses	  
of	  that	  which	  is	  privately	  owned	  within	  the	  state’s	  claimed	  territory;	  (4)	  
rights	  to	  control	  or	  prohibit	  movement	  across	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  territory;	  
and	  (5)	  rights	  to	  limit	  or	  prohibit	  ‘dismemberment’	  of	  the	  state’s	  territories	  
(Simmons,	  2001,	  p.	  306;	  compare	  Stilz,	  2009,	  p.	  186).	  
Others,	  like	  David	  Miller	  (2011,	  pp.	  92–3),	  adopt	  a	  more	  parsimonious	  (although	  
still	  extensive)	  view.	  According	  to	  Miller	  territorial	  rights	  include	  rights	  to	  (1)	  
jurisdiction,	  (2)	  resources	  found	  on	  the	  territory	  and	  (3)	  control	  immigration.	  
	   For	  present	  purposes	  I	  will	  adopt	  only	  a	  very	  simple	  understanding	  of	  
territorial	  rights	  and	  focus	  on	  element	  (1)	  alone.	  That	  is,	  I	  will	  understand	  a	  state’s	  
territorial	  right	  as	  its	  exclusive	  right	  to	  rule	  within	  a	  certain	  geographical	  area.	  More	  
precisely,	  a	  state	  has	  a	  territorial	  right	  over	  area	  A	  if	  it	  has	  the	  exclusive	  moral	  right	  
to	  issue	  and	  enforce	  law	  (exercise	  political	  power)	  over	  people’s	  actions	  and	  
possessions	  in	  A	  because	  they	  are	  in	  A.2	  
	   This	  more	  modest	  focus	  is	  advisable	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  One	  is	  that	  it	  
will	  help	  to	  keep	  our	  discussion	  manageable.	  Another	  is	  that	  this	  is	  the	  only	  issue	  to	  
which	  Locke	  directly	  spoke.	  In	  any	  case,	  element	  (1)	  will	  likely	  be	  a	  centrally	  
important	  component	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  The	  present	  modest	  account	  thus	  avoids	  
begging	  any	  further	  questions.	  
	  
The	  Standard	  Reading	  
The	  question	  we	  are	  asking	  is	  under	  what	  conditions,	  for	  Locke,	  can	  a	  state	  have	  
rightful	  jurisdiction	  over	  land?	  When	  has	  a	  state	  legitimate	  authority	  over	  people	  
and	  their	  possessions	  because	  they	  are	  present	  in	  a	  particular	  area	  (the	  territory)?	  
	   According	  to	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  of	  Locke,	  a	  state	  obtains	  territorial	  
rights	  because	  the	  original	  founders	  of	  political	  society	  submitted,	  as	  part	  of	  their	  
consent,	  not	  only	  their	  persons	  to	  its	  authority	  but	  their	  property	  as	  well.	  In	  short,	  at	  
its	  founding,	  individuals	  transferred	  to	  the	  state	  some	  of	  the	  incidents	  of	  their	  
natural	  property	  rights.	  The	  state	  thus	  obtained	  the	  right	  to	  set	  conditions	  to	  the	  
subsequent	  use	  or	  ownership	  of	  the	  land.	  Among	  these	  conditions	  is	  that	  people	  
accept	  its	  authority.	  
	   A	  state’s	  territorial	  right	  is	  thus	  quite	  literally	  patched	  together	  from	  the	  
partially	  transferred	  property	  rights	  of	  its	  subjects.	  Its	  right	  to	  rule	  becomes	  
attached	  to	  the	  land	  in	  the	  same	  way	  easements	  can.	  For	  Locke,	  Simmons	  writes	  
(2001,	  p.	  317),	  ‘the	  state’s	  right	  to	  territory	  constitute[s]	  a	  weak	  form	  of	  property’.	  
This	  reading	  is	  said	  to	  find	  support	  in	  a	  number	  of	  passages	  from	  Locke’s	  Second	  
Treatise,	  and	  especially	  section	  120.	  There	  Locke	  writes:	  
By	  the	  same	  Act	  therefore,	  whereby	  any	  one	  unites	  his	  Person,	  which	  was	  
before	  free,	  to	  any	  Commonwealth;	  by	  the	  same	  he	  unites	  his	  Possessions,	  
which	  were	  before	  free,	  to	  it	  also;	  and	  they	  become,	  both	  of	  them,	  Person	  and	  
Possession,	  subject	  to	  the	  Government	  and	  Dominion	  of	  that	  Commonwealth,	  
as	  long	  as	  it	  hath	  a	  being	  (Locke,	  1988	  [1689],	  Second	  Treatise	  [II],	  para.	  
120).3	  
Thus,	  anyone	  who	  later	  acquires	  or	  enjoys	  any	  of	  the	  land	  annexed	  to	  the	  
commonwealth	  ‘must	  take	  it	  with	  the	  Condition	  it	  is	  under;	  that	  is,	  of	  submitting	  to	  
the	  Government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth’	  (II,	  120,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  
	   Similarly,	  in	  II,	  73,	  Locke	  asserts	  that,	  despite	  people’s	  inability	  to	  subject	  
others	  to	  political	  authority,	  children	  can	  end	  up	  incurring	  political	  obligations	  as	  a	  
consequence	  of	  their	  parents’	  actions.	  After	  their	  parents’	  decision	  to	  submit	  their	  
property,	  they	  can	  only	  enjoy	  the	  land	  on	  which	  they	  have	  grown	  up	  on	  the	  
condition	  that	  they	  accept	  the	  sovereign’s	  authority:	  
there	  being	  always	  annexed	  to	  the	  Enjoyment	  of	  Land,	  a	  Submission	  to	  the	  
Government	  of	  the	  Country,	  of	  which	  that	  Land	  is	  a	  part;	  ...	  it	  being	  only	  a	  
necessary	  Condition	  annex’d	  to	  the	  Land,	  and	  the	  inheritance	  of	  an	  Estate	  
which	  is	  under	  that	  Government,	  reaches	  only	  those	  who	  will	  take	  it	  on	  that	  
Condition,	  and	  so	  is	  no	  natural	  Tye	  or	  Engagement,	  but	  a	  voluntary	  
Submission	  ...	  if	  they	  will	  enjoy	  the	  Inheritance	  of	  their	  Ancestors,	  they	  must	  
take	  it	  on	  the	  same	  terms	  their	  Ancestors	  had	  it,	  and	  submit	  to	  all	  the	  
Conditions	  annex’d	  to	  such	  a	  Possession	  (emphasis	  in	  original).4	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  state’s	  partial	  ownership	  of	  the	  land,	  subsequent	  people	  can	  enter	  
the	  territory	  only	  if	  they	  (tacitly)	  consent	  to	  accept	  the	  terms	  set	  by	  the	  state.	  Locke	  
writes:	  
every	  Man,	  that	  hath	  any	  Possession,	  or	  Enjoyment,	  of	  any	  part	  of	  the	  
Dominions	  of	  any	  Government,	  doth	  thereby	  give	  his	  tacit	  Consent,	  and	  is	  as	  
far	  forth	  obliged	  to	  Obedience	  to	  the	  Laws	  of	  that	  Government,	  during	  such	  
Enjoyment,	  as	  any	  one	  under	  it	  (II,	  119)	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  
Such	  tacit	  consent	  is	  given	  by	  ‘barely	  travelling	  freely	  on	  the	  Highway;	  and	  in	  Effect,	  
it	  reaches	  as	  far	  as	  the	  very	  being	  of	  any	  one	  within	  the	  Territories	  of	  that	  
Government’	  (II,	  119),	  and	  by	  residing	  on	  the	  land	  that	  is	  within	  a	  state’s	  rightful	  
territory,	  ‘living	  quietly,	  and	  enjoying	  Priviledges	  and	  Protection	  under	  them’	  (II,	  
122).	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  state	  acquires	  a	  lasting	  territorial	  right	  over	  the	  area.5	  
	  
Two	  Problems	  
The	  textual	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  standard	  interpretation	  appears	  to	  be	  strong.	  In	  
the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  show	  that	  this	  appearance	  is	  deceptive.	  First,	  however,	  I	  will	  
point	  out	  two	  serious	  problems	  with	  the	  standard	  reading:	  for	  Locke,	  the	  
submission	  of	  property	  by	  subjects	  is	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  a	  state’s	  
territorial	  rights.	  
	  
The	  Submission	  of	  Property	  is	  Not	  Necessary	  for	  a	  State’s	  Territorial	  Rights	  
A	  state’s	  territorial	  right	  is	  the	  right	  that	  people	  accept	  its	  authority	  if	  they	  are	  in	  a	  
territory.	  The	  first	  source	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  standard	  reading	  is	  that	  Locke	  does	  
not	  think	  transfers	  of	  property	  necessary	  for	  a	  state’s	  right	  that	  people	  in	  its	  
territory	  accept	  its	  authority.	  
	   One	  way	  to	  see	  this	  is	  by	  looking	  at	  Locke’s	  doctrine	  of	  tacit	  consent.	  Locke	  
discusses	  tacit	  consent	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  contexts,	  including	  his	  treatment	  of	  
the	  founding	  of	  political	  societies.	  He	  repeatedly	  asserts	  that	  such	  societies	  can	  be	  
founded	  by	  tacit	  consent.6	  However,	  this	  foundational	  tacit	  consent	  must	  be	  given	  
for	  some	  other	  reason	  than	  that	  one	  is	  on	  a	  state’s	  rightful	  territory.	  After	  all,	  no	  
such	  state	  can	  exist	  before	  foundational	  consent	  has	  been	  given.	  So	  even	  if	  tacit	  
consent	  to	  a	  state	  with	  territorial	  rights	  is	  given	  because	  of	  previously	  submitted	  
property	  rights,	  foundational	  tacit	  consent	  is	  not.	  
	   Locke	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  in	  this	  context.	  He	  talks	  
about	  the	  organic	  processes	  by	  which	  small-­‐scale	  families	  develop	  into	  early	  civil	  
societies.	  Thus,	  in	  II,	  94,	  Locke	  talks	  about	  cases	  where	  a	  sovereign’s	  authority	  ‘by	  a	  
tacit	  Consent	  devolved	  into	  his	  hands’,	  because	  of	  ‘some	  one	  good	  and	  excellent	  
Man,	  having	  got	  a	  Preheminency	  amongst	  the	  rest’.	  This	  tacit	  consent	  was	  given	  
because	  people	  ‘tacitly	  submitted	  to	  it,	  and	  the	  easiness	  and	  equality	  of	  it	  not	  
offending	  any	  one,	  every	  one	  acquiesced,	  till	  time	  seemed	  to	  have	  confirmed	  it’	  (II,	  
110).	  In	  early	  civil	  societies,	  states	  develop	  gradually,	  with	  people	  tacitly	  consenting	  
to	  them	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  to	  do	  with	  custom	  and	  acquiescence.	  
	   Locke	  takes	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  processes	  to	  be	  genuine	  political	  states.	  
After	  all,	  the	  point	  of	  these	  sections	  is	  that	  fathers	  do	  not	  (qua	  fathers)	  have	  natural	  
authority	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  states	  originally	  developed	  out	  of	  families.	  Thus,	  Locke	  
writes	  that	  ‘the	  natural	  Fathers	  of	  Families,	  by	  an	  insensible	  change,	  became	  the	  
politick	  Monarchs	  of	  them	  too’	  (II,	  76,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Visitors	  and	  newcomers	  
in	  these	  states	  will	  thus	  have	  to	  consent	  tacitly	  to	  their	  authority,	  otherwise	  
historically	  early	  states	  would	  have	  been	  without	  territorial	  rights	  until	  subjects	  
decided	  to	  submit	  their	  property.	  This	  would	  have	  made	  such	  societies	  very	  
different	  from	  all	  other	  states	  Locke	  discusses	  in	  the	  Two	  Treatises,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
reason	  to	  believe	  this	  was	  the	  case.	  Nor	  is	  there	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  territorial	  
rights	  of	  these	  early	  societies	  were	  created	  on	  some	  separate	  occasion.7	  
	   The	  same	  is	  visible	  in	  Locke’s	  treatment	  of	  jurisdiction	  over	  coastal	  waters.	  
Locke	  describes	  the	  ocean	  as	  unowned,	  ‘that	  great	  and	  still	  remaining	  Common	  of	  
Mankind’	  (II,	  30).	  The	  oceans	  are	  held	  in	  common	  given	  Locke’s	  labor	  theory	  of	  
appropriation	  –	  they	  could	  not	  be	  privately	  appropriated	  since	  they	  cannot	  be	  
improved	  by	  laboring	  on	  them.	  All	  one	  can	  establish	  property	  in	  is	  what	  one	  might	  
extract	  from	  the	  sea	  by	  laboring:	  ‘what	  Fish	  any	  one	  catches	  in	  the	  Ocean	  ...	  is	  by	  the	  
Labour	  that	  removes	  it	  out	  of	  that	  common	  state	  Nature	  left	  it	  in,	  made	  his	  Property’	  
(II,	  30,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  
	   It	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  if	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  were	  necessary	  for	  a	  
state	  to	  have	  jurisdictional	  rights	  over	  territory,	  then	  states	  could	  not	  have	  
jurisdiction	  over	  their	  coastal	  waters.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  a	  novel	  and	  highly	  
controversial	  view	  in	  Locke’s	  time	  since	  the	  status	  of	  the	  high	  seas	  and	  coastal	  
waters	  was	  subject	  to	  heated	  political	  and	  philosophical	  debates.	  These	  issues	  
occupy	  a	  central	  place	  in	  the	  works	  of	  Grotius	  and	  Pufendorf,	  both	  of	  whom	  Locke	  
deeply	  admired	  and	  with	  whose	  work	  he	  engaged.	  And	  the	  English	  and	  Scots	  were	  
engaged	  in	  a	  dispute	  with	  the	  Dutch	  over	  fishing	  rights	  in	  their	  coastal	  waters	  (Tuck,	  
1999).	  The	  fact	  that	  Locke	  did	  not	  think	  himself	  compelled	  even	  to	  mention	  the	  
possibility	  that	  his	  view	  might	  imply	  rejection	  of	  the	  consensus	  view	  that	  coastal	  
waters	  could	  fall	  within	  a	  sovereign’s	  jurisdiction	  is	  further	  evidence	  against	  the	  
contention	  that	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  is	  necessary	  for	  territorial	  rights.	  
	   If	  Locke’s	  discussion	  of	  early	  political	  societies	  and	  coastal	  waters	  suggests	  
that	  transfers	  of	  property	  are	  not	  necessary	  for	  a	  state	  to	  acquire	  territorial	  rights,	  
the	  substance	  of	  his	  views	  suggests	  the	  same.	  For	  Locke,	  the	  transfer	  of	  property	  
cannot	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  rightful	  exercise	  of	  political	  power.	  For	  one,	  the	  powers	  
of	  government	  are	  based	  on	  people’s	  transferred	  executive	  rights	  to	  enforce	  the	  law	  
of	  nature	  (II,	  171).	  But	  people’s	  executive	  rights	  are	  natural	  rights,	  whereas	  
property	  rights	  are	  acquired.	  Whether	  or	  not	  one	  has	  the	  executive	  right	  thus	  cannot	  
depend	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  one	  has	  a	  (partial)	  property	  right.8	  Moreover,	  the	  
permissibility	  of	  exercising	  one’s	  executive	  right	  can	  also	  not	  be	  limited	  by	  other	  
people’s	  property	  rights.	  Criminals	  cannot	  escape	  justice	  by	  insisting	  on	  their	  
property	  rights.	  If	  they	  could,	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  would	  be	  marred	  by	  serious	  
injustice,	  not	  mere	  ‘inconveniences’.	  
	   For	  Locke,	  then,	  states	  can	  gain	  a	  right	  to	  rule	  over	  a	  part	  of	  the	  earth,	  and	  
thus	  a	  right	  that	  the	  people	  who	  are	  present	  there	  consent	  or	  leave,	  without	  first	  
securing	  their	  (partial)	  property	  rights.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  is	  
not	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  territorial	  rights	  of	  states.	  
	  
The	  Submission	  of	  Property	  is	  Not	  Sufficient	  for	  a	  State’s	  Territorial	  Rights	  
The	  argument	  above	  opens	  up	  the	  alternative	  reading	  proposed	  below.	  Before	  
moving	  on	  to	  develop	  that	  view,	  however,	  let	  us	  consider	  another,	  potentially	  more	  
devastating	  problem:	  contrary	  to	  the	  standard	  reading,	  Locke’s	  arguments	  in	  the	  
First	  Treatise	  imply	  that	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  could	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  a	  state	  
to	  obtain	  territorial	  rights.9	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	  the	  First	  Treatise,	  of	  course,	  was	  to	  critique	  the	  views	  of	  
Robert	  Filmer.	  In	  Patriarcha,	  Filmer	  had	  defended	  absolute	  government	  by	  arguing	  
that	  political	  authority	  lies	  with	  the	  descendants	  of	  Adam.	  God	  had	  given	  the	  entire	  
earth	  to	  Adam,	  and	  this	  secured	  Adam’s	  absolute	  title	  to	  govern.	  The	  authority	  of	  
subsequent	  rulers	  depended	  on	  their	  inheriting	  this	  title	  from	  Adam.	  A	  key	  part	  of	  
Filmer’s	  view,	  therefore,	  was	  that	  ‘the	  first	  principles	  of	  government	  ...	  necessarily	  
depend	  upon	  the	  original	  of	  property’.10	  
	   Locke	  provided	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  against	  this.	  His	  strategy	  was	  to	  
outline	  the	  various	  steps	  of	  Filmer’s	  argument,	  and	  criticize	  each	  of	  them	  separately.	  
Thus,	  Locke	  argued	  that	  God	  had	  granted	  Adam	  only	  the	  right	  to	  use	  the	  earth,	  not	  a	  
full-­‐blown	  property	  right.	  But	  more	  important	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  Locke’s	  claim	  
that,	  even	  if	  Adam	  had	  a	  genuine	  property	  right	  to	  the	  entire	  earth,	  this	  still	  could	  
not	  establish	  his	  rightful	  authority	  or	  sovereignty.	  The	  passages	  I	  discuss	  below	  
contain	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  Locke’s	  argument.	  
	   An	  important	  part	  of	  Locke’s	  argument	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  conceptual	  
distinction	  between	  property	  and	  sovereignty.	  Locke	  devotes	  a	  number	  of	  sections	  
in	  chapter	  nine	  of	  the	  First	  Treatise	  to	  this.	  Part	  of	  his	  argument	  is	  that	  property	  and	  
sovereignty	  are	  disanalogous	  in	  two	  important	  ways.	  First,	  the	  appropriate	  rules	  for	  
the	  succession	  of	  political	  authority	  are	  nothing	  like	  those	  for	  the	  inheritance	  of	  
property	  (I,	  91,	  93).	  And	  second,	  the	  rationale	  behind	  property,	  and	  the	  freedom	  it	  
affords	  its	  owner,	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  rationale	  behind	  sovereignty,	  and	  the	  
freedom	  it	  affords	  its	  holder.	  Locke	  writes:	  
Property,	  whose	  Original	  is	  from	  the	  Right	  a	  Man	  has	  to	  use	  any	  of	  the	  
Inferior	  Creatures,	  for	  the	  Subsistence	  and	  Comfort	  of	  his	  Life,	  is	  for	  the	  
benefit	  and	  sole	  Advantage	  of	  the	  Proprietor,	  so	  that	  he	  may	  even	  destroy	  the	  
thing,	  that	  he	  has	  Property	  in	  by	  his	  use	  of	  it,	  where	  need	  requires:	  but	  
Government	  being	  for	  the	  Preservation	  of	  every	  Mans	  Right	  and	  Property,	  by	  
preserving	  him	  from	  the	  Violence	  or	  Injury	  of	  others,	  is	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  
Governed	  ...	  the	  Sword	  is	  not	  given	  the	  Magistrate	  for	  his	  own	  good	  alone	  (I,	  
92).	  
If	  authority	  were	  based	  in	  property,	  then	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  former	  should	  be	  
similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  latter.	  But	  they	  are	  not.	  Property	  may	  be	  used	  for	  the	  benefit	  
of	  its	  possessor.	  Sovereignty	  is	  supposed	  to	  aim	  at	  the	  preservation	  of	  all.	  Therefore,	  
sovereignty	  is	  not	  a	  form	  of	  property.11	  
	   This	  argument	  and	  the	  distinction	  upon	  which	  it	  rests	  were	  clearly	  important	  
to	  Locke.	  He	  helps	  himself	  to	  them	  at	  various	  points	  in	  the	  First	  Treatise.	  One	  
example	  is	  section	  41,	  where	  Locke	  considers	  what	  would	  follow	  if	  one	  were	  
nevertheless	  to	  accept,	  as	  Filmer	  did,	  that	  Adam	  had	  been	  given	  the	  entire	  earth	  as	  
his	  private	  property:	  
But	  yet,	  if	  after	  all,	  any	  one	  will	  needs	  have	  it	  so,	  that	  by	  this	  Donation	  of	  God,	  
Adam	  was	  made	  sole	  Proprietor	  of	  the	  whole	  Earth,	  what	  will	  this	  be	  to	  his	  
Soveraignty?	  And	  how	  will	  it	  appear,	  that	  Property	  in	  Land	  gives	  a	  Man	  
Power	  over	  the	  Life	  of	  another?	  or	  how	  will	  the	  Possession	  even	  of	  the	  whole	  
Earth,	  give	  any	  one	  a	  Soveraign	  Arbitrary	  Authority	  over	  the	  Persons	  of	  Men?	  
(I,	  41,	  emphasis	  in	  original)	  
Because	  of	  the	  hard	  conceptual	  distinction	  between	  property	  and	  authority,	  
establishing	  that	  Adam	  had	  property	  over	  the	  world	  could	  not	  establish	  his	  
authority	  to	  govern.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  to	  own	  land,	  but	  quite	  another	  to	  have	  the	  right	  
to	  govern	  over	  people	  and	  their	  possessions.	  
	   The	  same	  point	  appears	  earlier	  in	  the	  First	  Treatise.	  Locke	  observes	  that	  even	  
if	  it	  had	  been	  God’s	  will	  that	  ‘Adam	  was	  made	  General	  Lord	  of	  all	  Things,	  one	  may	  
very	  clearly	  understand	  him,	  that	  he	  means	  nothing	  to	  be	  granted	  to	  Adam	  here	  but	  
Property,	  and	  therefore	  he	  says	  not	  one	  word	  of	  Adam’s	  Monarchy’	  (I,	  23,	  emphasis	  
in	  original).	  
	   These	  passages	  and	  their	  argument	  create	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  standard	  
reading.	  The	  thesis	  that,	  for	  Locke,	  territorial	  rights	  are	  ultimately	  based	  in	  
transferred	  property	  rights	  creates	  a	  serious	  tension,	  not	  to	  say	  outright	  
contradiction,	  within	  his	  work.	  It	  requires	  us	  to	  read	  Locke	  as	  first	  denouncing	  the	  
view	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  grounded	  in	  property	  in	  the	  First	  Treatise,	  only	  to	  put	  
forward	  a	  similar	  justification	  himself	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise.	  Such	  a	  reading	  is	  
implausible.	  
	   The	  defender	  of	  the	  standard	  reading	  might	  object	  here	  that	  Locke	  is	  making	  
a	  more	  limited	  point,	  namely	  that	  no	  direct	  inference	  from	  property	  to	  authority	  is	  
possible.	  This	  would	  pose	  no	  conflict	  with	  the	  standard	  reading,	  which	  holds	  not	  
that	  rights	  to	  property	  are	  the	  same	  as	  rights	  to	  authority,	  but	  only	  that	  (partial)	  
rights	  to	  property	  enable	  the	  state	  to	  demand	  that	  people	  consent	  to	  its	  authority.	  
The	  relation	  between	  property	  and	  sovereignty	  according	  to	  the	  standard	  reading,	  
then,	  is	  an	  indirect	  one,	  mediated	  by	  tacit	  consent	  (Simmons,	  2001,	  pp.	  317–8).	  
	   The	  problem	  with	  this	  response	  is	  that	  Locke	  explicitly	  denies	  it.	  This	  denial	  
comes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Locke’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  property	  and	  
sovereignty	  is	  so	  robust	  as	  to	  preclude	  any	  derivation	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  property,	  
including	  by	  roundabout	  ways.	  This	  argument	  appears	  in	  sections	  41–3	  of	  the	  First	  
Treatise.	  These	  passages	  are	  now	  mostly	  famous	  for	  their	  endorsement	  of	  a	  right	  to	  
use	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  subsistence	  but	  play	  a	  quite	  different	  role	  in	  the	  First	  
Treatise.	  They	  establish	  that	  no	  derivation	  of	  sovereignty	  from	  property	  whatsoever	  
can	  succeed.	  
	   To	  show	  this,	  Locke	  imagines	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  someone	  who	  owned	  the	  
entire	  world	  would	  deny	  others	  access	  or	  use	  of	  that	  property	  unless	  they	  recognize	  
him	  as	  sovereign.	  Even	  this	  indirect	  way	  of	  grounding	  sovereignty	  in	  property	  must	  
fail,	  he	  says,	  because	  our	  property	  rights	  are	  circumscribed	  so	  as	  to	  rule	  out	  any	  
such	  offer:	  
The	  most	  specious	  thing	  to	  be	  said,	  is,	  that	  he	  that	  is	  Proprietor	  of	  the	  whole	  
World,	  may	  deny	  all	  the	  rest	  of	  Mankind	  Food,	  and	  so	  at	  his	  pleasure	  starve	  
them,	  if	  they	  will	  not	  acknowledge	  his	  Soveraignty,	  and	  Obey	  his	  Will.	  If	  this	  
were	  true,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  good	  Argument	  to	  prove,	  that	  there	  never	  was	  any	  
such	  Property	  (I,	  41,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  
Locke	  casts	  his	  objection	  here	  in	  terms	  of	  absolute	  or	  arbitrary	  authority	  (the	  kind	  
defended	  by	  Filmer).12	  But	  his	  argument	  is	  the	  fundamental	  one	  mentioned	  above.	  
This	  is	  clear	  because	  in	  the	  surrounding	  passages	  Locke	  explains	  that	  ‘a	  Man	  can	  no	  
more	  justly	  make	  use	  of	  another’s	  necessity,	  to	  force	  him	  to	  become	  his	  Vassal,	  by	  
with-­‐holding	  that	  Relief,	  God	  requires	  him	  to	  afford	  to	  the	  wants	  of	  his	  Brother’	  (I,	  
42);	  and	  also	  because	  he	  concludes	  that	  ‘all	  this	  would	  not	  prove	  that	  Propriety	  in	  
Land,	  even	  in	  this	  Case,	  gave	  any	  Authority	  over	  the	  Persons	  of	  Men,	  but	  only	  that	  
Compact	  might’	  (I,	  43,	  emphasis	  added).	  
	   ‘Even	  in	  this	  case’:	  the	  phrase	  is	  significant.	  Locke	  is	  emphasizing	  that	  even	  
the	  strongest	  and	  most	  comprehensive	  kind	  of	  ownership	  in	  land	  could	  not	  ground	  
rightful	  authority.	  And	  the	  suggestion	  is	  that	  if	  even	  this	  kind	  of	  ownership	  fails	  to	  
support	  authority,	  then	  no	  kind	  of	  ownership	  could.	  This	  is	  why	  Locke	  concludes	  
this	  part	  of	  his	  argument	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘it	  is	  clear,	  that	  tho’	  God	  should	  have	  given	  
Adam	  Private	  Dominion,	  yet	  that	  Private	  Dominion	  could	  give	  him	  no	  Sovereignty’	  (I,	  
43,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  That	  is,	  whatever	  else	  the	  possession	  of	  property	  might	  
enable	  one	  to	  do,	  because	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  is	  morally	  circumscribed,	  it	  cannot	  
make	  one	  a	  sovereign.13	  
	   The	  best	  interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  First	  Treatise,	  then,	  is	  that	  it	  denies	  that	  the	  
possession	  of	  property	  can	  be	  sufficient	  for	  state	  authority	  over	  land.	  Locke’s	  
argument	  is	  twofold.	  We	  cannot	  derive	  authority	  from	  property	  directly	  because	  
property	  is	  conceptually	  distinct	  from	  authority.	  And	  we	  cannot	  derive	  authority	  
from	  property	  indirectly	  because	  property	  rights	  are	  circumscribed	  in	  ways	  that	  
preclude	  this.	  
	   The	  standard	  reading	  ascribes	  to	  Locke	  the	  denial	  of	  either	  of	  those	  claims.	  It	  
thus	  runs	  into	  a	  serious	  problem.	  Not	  only	  is	  it	  contrary	  to	  Locke’s	  explicitly	  stated	  
view,	  but	  it	  also	  threatens	  to	  undo	  a	  central	  part	  of	  Locke’s	  argument	  against	  Filmer.	  
For	  if	  the	  partial	  transfer	  of	  property	  rights	  could	  suffice	  for	  a	  state’s	  territorial	  
rights,	  then	  surely	  the	  more	  extensive	  property	  that	  Filmer	  alleged	  Adam	  and	  his	  
descendants	  enjoyed	  could	  do	  the	  same	  job.	  
	  
The	  Evidence	  for	  the	  Standard	  Reading	  Reconsidered	  
I	  have	  said	  that	  Locke	  thought	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  by	  individual	  subjects	  to	  
be	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  sufficient	  for	  a	  state	  to	  obtain	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  over	  a	  
territory.	  But	  what	  about	  the	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  standard	  reading?	  What	  about	  
those	  passages	  where	  Locke	  speaks	  of	  the	  property	  of	  subjects	  as	  submitted	  to	  the	  
sovereign?	  No	  credible	  interpretation	  can	  discount	  these	  remarks.	  
	   However,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  discount	  these	  remarks.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  
again	  the	  key	  passages	  that	  are	  said	  to	  support	  the	  standard	  reading:	  II,	  73	  and	  120.	  
Since	  the	  two	  are	  similar	  and	  II,	  120	  is	  often	  presented	  as	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  
standard	  reading,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  latter.	  I	  here	  reproduce	  the	  section	  in	  its	  
entirety:	  
To	  understand	  this	  the	  better,	  it	  is	  fit	  to	  consider,	  that	  every	  Man,	  when	  he,	  at	  
first,	  incorporates	  himself	  into	  any	  Commonwealth,	  he,	  by	  his	  uniting	  himself	  
thereunto,	  annexed	  also,	  and	  submits	  to	  the	  Community	  those	  Possessions,	  
which	  he	  has,	  or	  shall	  acquire,	  that	  do	  not	  already	  belong	  to	  any	  other	  
Government.	  For	  it	  would	  be	  a	  direct	  Contradiction,	  for	  any	  one	  to	  enter	  into	  
Society	  with	  others	  for	  the	  securing	  and	  regulating	  of	  Property:	  And	  yet	  to	  
suppose	  his	  Land,	  whose	  Property	  is	  to	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  Laws	  of	  the	  
Society,	  should	  be	  exempt	  from	  the	  Jurisdiction	  of	  that	  Government,	  to	  which	  
he	  himself	  the	  Proprietor	  of	  the	  Land	  is	  a	  Subject.	  By	  the	  same	  Act	  therefore,	  
whereby	  any	  one	  unites	  his	  Person,	  which	  was	  before	  free,	  to	  any	  
Commonwealth;	  by	  the	  same	  he	  unites	  his	  Possessions,	  which	  were	  before	  
free,	  to	  it	  also;	  and	  they	  become,	  both	  of	  them,	  Person	  and	  Possession,	  subject	  
to	  the	  Government	  and	  Dominion	  of	  that	  Commonwealth,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  hath	  a	  
being.	  Whoever	  therefore,	  from	  thenceforth,	  by	  Inheritance,	  Purchase,	  
Permission,	  or	  otherways	  enjoys	  any	  part	  of	  the	  Land,	  so	  annext	  to,	  and	  under	  
the	  Government	  of	  that	  Commonwealth,	  must	  take	  it	  with	  the	  Condition	  it	  is	  
under;	  that	  is,	  of	  submitting	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth,	  under	  
whose	  Jurisdiction	  it	  is,	  as	  far	  forth,	  as	  any	  Subject	  of	  it	  (emphasis	  in	  
original).	  
Two	  things	  are	  clear.	  First,	  Locke	  maintains	  that	  whoever	  submits	  to	  government	  
must	  thereby	  also	  submit	  their	  property.	  The	  argument	  for	  this	  is	  the	  practical	  
purpose	  of	  government.	  The	  need	  for	  an	  impartial	  judge	  that	  protects	  and	  
determines	  property	  rights	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  motivations	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  
political	  society.	  Thus,	  a	  view	  according	  to	  which	  property	  would	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  
the	  sovereign’s	  authority	  would	  make	  it	  impossible	  for	  government	  to	  perform	  its	  
essential	  functions.	  This	  ‘would	  be	  a	  direct	  Contradiction’.14	  Second,	  the	  state’s	  
authority	  over	  land	  survives	  its	  individual	  possession.	  Subsequent	  owners	  ‘must	  
take	  it	  with	  the	  Condition	  it	  is	  under’:	  they	  are	  not	  free	  both	  to	  own	  the	  property	  and	  
to	  refuse	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  state’s	  authority.	  
	   What	  is	  less	  clear,	  however,	  is	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  section	  supports	  the	  
standard	  interpretation	  over	  alternative	  readings.	  After	  all,	  Locke’s	  claim	  that	  a	  
state’s	  subjects	  must	  accept	  its	  authority	  not	  only	  over	  their	  persons	  but	  also	  over	  
their	  property	  is	  one	  that	  any	  view	  of	  territorial	  rights	  will	  accept.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  
if	  a	  state	  has	  territorial	  rights,	  owners	  of	  land	  in	  that	  territory	  must	  recognize	  that	  
government’s	  authority	  over	  both	  their	  persons	  and	  their	  land.	  This	  is	  just	  what	  it	  
means	  for	  a	  state	  to	  have	  territorial	  rights,	  lest	  one	  wants	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  ‘direct	  
Contradiction’.	  
	   Indeed,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  II,	  120	  represents	  Locke’s	  summary	  of	  
the	  correct	  conclusion	  of	  his	  argument	  in	  defense	  of	  a	  state’s	  territorial	  rights,	  not	  
his	  explanation	  of	  what	  grounds	  territorial	  rights.	  The	  topic	  that	  Locke	  is	  addressing	  
here	  concerns	  the	  conditions	  of	  giving	  consent,	  not	  the	  conditions	  of	  acquiring	  
jurisdiction.	  Locke	  is	  focusing	  on	  the	  position	  of	  subjects	  and	  denies	  that	  they	  can	  
own	  property	  within	  a	  state’s	  territory	  without	  its	  falling	  under	  the	  state’s	  
jurisdiction.	  The	  submission	  of	  property	  discussed	  in	  II,	  120,	  then,	  may	  refer	  not	  to	  
some	  act	  of	  ‘submission’	  as	  the	  source	  of	  territorial	  rights,	  but	  to	  ‘submission’	  as	  the	  
condition	  of	  being	  subject	  to	  state	  authority.	  
	   We	  must	  take	  caution	  not	  to	  infer	  from	  (1)	  the	  claim	  that	  if	  a	  state	  obtains	  its	  
territorial	  rights	  by	  its	  individual	  subjects	  submitting	  their	  property,	  then	  
subsequent	  owners	  cannot	  own	  such	  property	  without	  recognizing	  the	  state’s	  
authority	  over	  it,	  and	  (2)	  Locke’s	  explicit	  affirmation	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  people	  cannot	  
own	  property	  that	  lies	  within	  the	  state’s	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  without	  recognizing	  
the	  state’s	  authority	  over	  it,	  (3)	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  for	  Locke,	  a	  state	  obtains	  its	  
territorial	  rights	  by	  its	  individual	  subjects	  submitting	  their	  property.	  That	  would	  
commit	  the	  fallacy	  of	  affirming	  the	  consequent.	  
	   The	  textual	  evidence	  for	  the	  standard	  reading	  of	  Locke,	  therefore,	  is	  neutral	  
as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  state’s	  territorial	  rights	  or	  how	  it	  may	  obtain	  these.	  
	  
Locke	  on	  Territory	  Revisited	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  arguments,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  
views	  on	  territory	  –	  one	  that	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  property.	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  
territorial	  rights,	  I	  submit,	  consists	  of	  two	  elements.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  state’s	  ‘internal’	  
right	  to	  govern	  over	  all	  who	  are	  within	  its	  territory.	  This	  a	  state	  can	  obtain	  by	  
governing	  effectively	  and	  justly	  within	  an	  area,	  thereby	  providing	  important	  
benefits	  to	  its	  subjects,	  with	  the	  people’s	  consent.	  The	  second	  is	  a	  state’s	  ‘external’	  
right	  that	  other	  states	  not	  similarly	  exercise	  political	  power	  within	  its	  territory.	  This	  
a	  state	  can	  obtain	  through	  international	  treaties.	  These	  elements	  constitute	  
territorial	  rights:	  a	  state’s	  exclusive	  moral	  right	  to	  issue,	  enforce	  and	  adjudicate	  law	  
concerning	  people’s	  persons	  and	  possessions	  within	  an	  area.	  
	  
Territorial	  Rights	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Subjects	  
To	  see	  how	  states	  might	  obtain	  the	  right	  that	  the	  people	  in	  their	  territories	  accept	  
their	  authority,	  let	  us	  return	  to	  Locke’s	  discussion	  of	  how	  states	  historically	  came	  
about.	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  Locke	  thought	  that	  most	  early	  civil	  societies	  were	  not	  
founded	  by	  people	  literally	  coming	  together	  and	  expressly	  consenting	  to	  give	  up	  
their	  natural	  executive	  rights,	  but	  by	  the	  gradual	  development	  of	  small	  family-­‐based	  
units	  into	  political	  communities.	  
	   Locke	  considers	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  early	  development	  of	  
political	  authority	  might	  have	  taken	  place.	  One	  was	  as	  the	  continuation	  of	  parental	  
authority,	  such	  as	  where	  ‘twas	  easie,	  and	  almost	  natural	  for	  Children	  by	  a	  tacit,	  and	  
scarce	  avoidable	  consent	  to	  make	  way	  for	  the	  Father’s	  Authority	  and	  Government’	  (II,	  
75,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  Another	  was	  by	  a	  kind	  of	  salience,	  when	  ‘some	  one	  good	  
and	  excellent	  Man,	  having	  got	  a	  Preheminency	  amongst	  the	  rest’	  comes	  to	  be	  
recognized	  as	  an	  authority	  (II,	  94).	  Yet	  another	  was	  by	  necessity,	  when	  people	  
joined	  together	  for	  defense	  against	  external	  enemies	  (II,	  110).	  
	   As	  part	  of	  these	  processes,	  Locke	  thought,	  authorities	  received	  the	  consent	  of	  
those	  over	  whom	  they	  governed.	  Consent	  might	  be	  given	  expressly	  or	  tacitly,	  but	  
Locke	  repeatedly	  suggests	  that	  historically	  authority	  was	  first	  acquired	  by	  tacit	  
consent.	  The	  way	  in	  which	  tacit	  consent	  is	  given	  at	  the	  state’s	  founding	  resembles	  
the	  way	  subsequent	  generations	  give	  tacit	  consent.	  Later	  generations,	  Locke	  writes,	  
give	  tacit	  consent	  to	  the	  authorities	  by	  ‘living	  quietly,	  and	  enjoying	  Priviledges	  and	  
Protection	  under	  them’	  (II,	  122).	  Locke	  describes	  foundational	  tacit	  consent	  in	  
similar	  ways.	  II,	  94	  describes	  how	  a	  sovereign	  might	  have	  ‘Deference	  paid	  to	  his	  
Goodness	  and	  Vertue,	  as	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  Natural	  Authority’,	  and	  how	  this	  would	  lead	  to	  
genuine	  authority	  ‘by	  a	  tacit	  Consent	  devolved	  into	  his	  hands’.	  Similarly,	  II,	  110	  
compares	  tacit	  consent	  to	  acquiescence:	  
a	  Family	  by	  degrees	  grew	  up	  into	  a	  Commonwealth,	  and	  the	  Fatherly	  
Authority	  being	  continued	  on	  to	  the	  elder	  Son,	  every	  one	  in	  his	  turn	  growing	  
up	  under	  it,	  tacitly	  submitted	  to	  it,	  and	  the	  easiness	  and	  equality	  of	  it	  not	  
offending	  any	  one,	  every	  one	  acquiesced,	  till	  time	  seemed	  to	  have	  confirmed	  
it	  (emphasis	  in	  original).15	  
Not	  only	  does	  Locke’s	  description	  of	  how	  tacit	  consent	  is	  given	  at	  the	  state’s	  
founding	  resemble	  his	  description	  of	  how	  it	  is	  given	  once	  a	  state	  has	  territorial	  
rights,	  but	  he	  also	  sees	  them	  as	  having	  the	  same	  rationale.	  Continued	  residence	  
counts	  as	  tacit	  consent	  because	  of	  the	  many	  benefits	  the	  state	  provides	  compared	  to	  
the	  state	  of	  nature	  (II,	  130).	  This	  is	  the	  same	  reason	  for	  which	  people	  join	  into	  
society	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Emphasizing	  this	  point,	  Locke	  tellingly	  writes	  that	  the	  
benefits	  of	  civil	  society	  are	  ‘the	  original	  right	  and	  rise	  of	  both	  the	  Legislative	  and	  
Executive	  Power,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  the	  Governments	  and	  Societies	  themselves’	  (II,	  127,	  
emphasis	  in	  original).	  
	   The	  picture	  that	  arises	  is	  of	  states	  slowly	  and	  organically	  developing	  while	  
obtaining	  the	  tacit	  consent	  of	  the	  people	  by	  their	  continued	  residence,	  acquiescence	  
and	  approval.	  These	  states	  –	  the	  kind	  Locke	  was	  interested	  in	  justifying	  –	  have	  the	  
enduring	  right	  to	  rule	  over	  the	  land	  in	  the	  area	  over	  which	  they	  govern.	  That	  is,	  they	  
enjoy	  territorial	  rights.	  It	  follows	  that	  Locke	  considered	  tacit	  consent	  by	  
acquiescence	  or	  continued	  residence	  in	  a	  newly	  formed	  state	  sufficient	  (and,	  of	  
course,	  necessary)	  for	  it	  to	  acquire	  territorial	  rights.	  
	   Once	  a	  legitimate	  state	  is	  created,	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  acquires	  territorial	  rights	  
over	  the	  area	  within	  which	  it	  governed.	  II,	  120	  emphasizes	  this	  point.	  Consent	  gives	  
states	  rightful	  authority	  over	  not	  only	  persons	  but	  also	  land	  because:	  
it	  would	  be	  a	  direct	  Contradiction,	  for	  any	  one	  to	  enter	  into	  Society	  with	  
others	  for	  the	  securing	  and	  regulating	  of	  Property:	  And	  yet	  to	  suppose	  his	  
Land,	  whose	  Property	  is	  to	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  Laws	  of	  the	  Society,	  should	  be	  
exempt	  from	  the	  Jurisdiction	  of	  that	  Government.	  
And	  the	  state’s	  authority	  endures	  over	  time	  because:	  
Whoever	  therefore,	  from	  thenceforth,	  by	  Inheritance,	  Purchase,	  Permission,	  
or	  otherways	  enjoys	  any	  part	  of	  the	  Land,	  so	  annext	  to,	  and	  under	  the	  
Government	  of	  that	  Commonwealth,	  must	  take	  it	  with	  the	  Condition	  it	  is	  
under;	  that	  is,	  of	  submitting	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  under	  
whose	  Jurisdiction	  it	  is,	  as	  far	  forth,	  as	  any	  Subject	  of	  it	  (emphasis	  in	  
original).	  
Locke	  thus	  did	  not	  think	  of	  territorial	  rights	  as	  having	  some	  separate	  source.	  
Instead,	  they	  are	  the	  result	  of	  the	  very	  same	  processes	  by	  which	  states	  come	  about	  
and	  acquire	  authority	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  the	  stable	  exercise	  of	  political	  power,	  within	  
the	  bounds	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature,	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  people.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  
that	  Locke	  describes	  the	  tacit	  consent	  given	  at	  the	  state’s	  founding	  as	  ‘scarce	  
avoidable’	  (II,	  75),	  and	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  state	  of	  nature	  to	  civil	  society	  as	  ‘an	  
insensible	  change’	  (II,	  76).	  
	  
Territorial	  Rights	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Foreigners	  
The	  account	  above	  concerns	  the	  ‘internal’	  part	  of	  a	  state’s	  territorial	  rights.	  What	  
about	  the	  ‘external’	  part?	  How	  are	  we	  to	  delineate	  the	  separate	  territories	  of	  states?	  
And	  why,	  on	  this	  view,	  should	  states	  have	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  rule	  within	  them?	  
	   Locke’s	  answer	  appeals	  to	  international	  treaties.	  Early	  political	  societies,	  he	  
speculated,	  entered	  into	  agreements	  that	  determined	  their	  mutual	  boundaries.	  By	  
agreeing	  on	  where	  boundaries	  were	  to	  be	  drawn,	  sovereigns	  established	  mutually	  
exclusive	  spheres	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  agreed	  to	  respect	  their	  separate	  territories.	  
	   Locke	  discusses	  these	  treaties	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  and	  the	  Essays	  on	  the	  
Laws	  of	  Nature.	  The	  discussion	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  is	  offered	  in	  passing	  during	  his	  
defense	  of	  private	  property.	  Locke	  provides	  a	  number	  of	  arguments	  to	  show	  why	  
modern	  conditions	  do	  not	  violate	  the	  ‘enough,	  and	  as	  good’	  proviso	  for	  
appropriation.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  use	  of	  money	  is	  equivalent	  to	  consent	  to	  larger	  
holdings.	  Another	  is	  that	  appropriation	  did	  not	  subtract	  but	  added	  to	  what	  could	  be	  
owned	  because	  of	  resultant	  increases	  in	  productivity.	  His	  third	  argument	  is	  that,	  
sometime	  in	  the	  past,	  different	  political	  communities	  collectively	  gave	  their	  consent	  
to	  others’	  holdings	  as	  part	  of	  mutual	  treaties	  or	  ‘Leagues’.	  
	   However,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  only	  purpose	  of	  these	  treaties.	  In	  addition	  to	  
people	  mutually	  giving	  up	  their	  original	  rights	  to	  land	  abroad,	  they	  also	  settled	  
territorial	  boundaries.	  In	  II,	  38	  Locke	  offers	  a	  speculative	  history	  of	  early	  times.	  
People	  left	  their	  nomadic	  existence	  when	  they:	  
incorporated,	  settled	  themselves	  together,	  and	  built	  Cities,	  and	  then,	  by	  
consent,	  they	  came	  in	  time,	  to	  set	  out	  the	  bounds	  of	  their	  distinct	  Territories,	  
and	  agree	  on	  limits	  between	  them	  and	  their	  Neighbours,	  and	  by	  Laws	  within	  
themselves	  settled	  the	  Properties	  of	  those	  of	  the	  same	  Society	  (emphasis	  in	  
original).	  
Similarly,	  in	  II,	  45:	  
though	  afterwards,	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  World	  (where	  the	  Increase	  of	  People	  
and	  Stock,	  with	  the	  Use	  of	  Money)	  had	  made	  land	  scarce,	  and	  so	  of	  some	  
Value,	  the	  several	  Communities	  settled	  the	  Bounds	  of	  their	  distinct	  
Territories,	  and	  by	  Laws	  within	  themselves,	  regulated	  the	  Properties	  of	  the	  
private	  Men	  of	  their	  Society,	  and	  so,	  by	  Compact	  and	  Agreement,	  settled	  the	  
Property	  which	  Labour	  and	  Industry	  began	  (emphasis	  in	  original).	  
And	  in	  the	  Essays	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Nature	  Locke	  again	  claims	  that	  territories	  are	  
delineated	  by	  inter-­‐state	  agreements.	  He	  explicitly	  describes	  ‘the	  fixed	  boundary-­‐
lines	  between	  neighbouring	  peoples’	  as	  created	  by	  ‘an	  expressly	  stated	  contract’	  
(Locke,	  1997	  [1663–4],	  essay	  V,	  p.	  107).	  
	   These	  treaties	  fill	  two	  crucial	  gaps	  in	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  
First,	  they	  offer	  a	  principled	  way	  of	  deciding	  where	  one	  sovereign’s	  jurisdiction	  ends	  
and	  another’s	  begins.	  By	  drawing	  clear	  boundaries,	  these	  treaties	  demarcate	  the	  
separate	  territories	  of	  different	  societies.	  Second,	  they	  explain	  why	  sovereigns	  
cannot	  rightfully	  exercise	  power	  within	  each	  other’s	  jurisdictions.	  The	  governments	  
that	  sign	  these	  treaties	  become	  contractually	  obligated	  to	  respect	  each	  other’s	  
separate	  spheres	  of	  authority.	  
	   These	  treaties	  thus	  complement	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  territorial	  rights.	  How	  
might	  defenders	  of	  the	  standard	  reading	  see	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  treaties?	  At	  
first	  sight,	  there	  may	  seem	  no	  need	  for	  them:	  the	  boundaries	  of	  territories	  are	  
determined	  by	  the	  underlying	  property	  rights.	  But	  perhaps	  they	  can	  play	  a	  
supplementary	  role.	  They	  might,	  for	  example,	  draw	  boundaries	  wherever	  property	  
rights	  are	  disputed.	  In	  these	  cases,	  treaties	  determine	  jurisdictional	  boundaries	  by	  
determining	  the	  property	  rights	  on	  which	  territory	  is	  based.	  Another	  suggestion	  
might	  be	  that	  these	  treaties	  served	  to	  draw	  boundaries	  in	  places	  where	  the	  land	  
between	  societies	  was	  still	  unowned.16	  
	   But	  these	  suggestions	  lack	  support.	  Sections	  II,	  38	  and	  45	  quite	  simply	  state	  
that	  treaties	  settle	  territorial	  boundaries.	  They	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  unowned	  territory	  in	  
particular.	  Indeed,	  the	  passage	  in	  the	  Essays	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Nature	  does	  not	  mention	  
property	  at	  all.	  Moreover,	  when	  Locke	  does	  mention	  the	  need	  to	  settle	  property,	  he	  
says	  that	  this	  is	  the	  job	  of	  the	  internal	  laws	  of	  societies,	  not	  treaties.17	  
	   There	  are	  two	  further	  reasons	  for	  understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  
treaties	  as	  I	  have	  proposed.	  First,	  although	  we	  should	  not	  read	  too	  much	  into	  
Locke’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘territory’,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  term	  appears	  in	  only	  
two	  contexts	  in	  the	  Second	  Treatise.	  One	  is	  in	  Locke’s	  account	  of	  how	  tacit	  consent	  
makes	  people	  bound	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land.	  The	  other	  is	  how	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  legitimate	  states	  come	  into	  being	  in	  the	  passages	  quoted	  above.	  The	  
proposed	  reading	  explains	  this	  connection:	  for	  Locke,	  the	  term	  ‘territory’	  refers	  to	  
the	  area	  over	  which	  a	  state	  has	  the	  right	  to	  rule.	  
	   The	  second	  reason	  is	  that	  this	  reading	  best	  fits	  the	  intellectual	  context	  in	  
which	  Locke	  was	  working,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  debate	  between	  Grotius	  and	  
Pufendorf.	  I	  turn	  to	  this	  now.	  
	  
Grotius	  on	  Territory	  
Richard	  Tuck	  (1999;	  2003)	  and	  James	  Tully	  (1980)	  have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  an	  
under-­‐	  appreciated	  theme	  of	  Locke’s	  arguments	  in	  especially	  the	  Second	  Treatise.18	  
It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  Locke	  greatly	  admired	  both	  Grotius	  and	  Pufendorf.19	  Tuck	  and	  
Tully	  point	  out	  that	  throughout	  the	  Second	  Treatise	  Locke	  defends	  Grotius’	  
conclusions	  against	  criticisms	  by	  Pufendorf.	  For	  example,	  Locke	  argues	  that	  people	  
have	  a	  natural	  executive	  right	  to	  punish	  transgressions	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nature;	  that	  
‘perfect’	  slavery	  was	  possible	  only	  as	  the	  result	  of	  taking	  captives	  in	  war;	  and	  that	  
original	  appropriation	  is	  possible	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  others.	  
	   This	  provides	  another	  source	  of	  evidence	  about	  Locke’s	  views	  on	  territory.	  
Other	  things	  equal,	  a	  reading	  of	  Locke	  becomes	  more	  plausible	  if	  it	  coheres	  with	  the	  
views	  of	  Grotius,	  and	  conflicts	  with	  those	  of	  Pufendorf,	  rather	  than	  the	  reverse.	  As	  I	  
show	  below,	  there	  are	  significant	  similarities	  between	  Grotius’	  views	  on	  territory	  
and	  the	  reading	  I	  have	  proposed,	  while	  the	  standard	  reading	  aligns	  Locke	  with	  
Pufendorf.	  The	  reading	  I	  have	  proposed	  thus	  fits	  better	  the	  context	  of	  Locke’s	  
thought.	  
	   Among	  the	  most	  innovative	  and	  controversial	  parts	  of	  Grotius’	  writings	  have	  
been	  his	  comments	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  property	  and	  territory.	  Grotius	  began	  
discussion	  of	  this	  relation	  in	  The	  Free	  Sea,	  but	  extended	  and	  explicated	  this	  in	  The	  
Rights	  of	  War	  and	  Peace.	  He	  uses	  chapter	  3	  of	  book	  2	  to	  emphasize	  a	  distinction	  
between	  property	  (dominium)	  and	  jurisdiction	  (imperium).	  Grotius	  emphasizes	  this	  
distinction	  because	  property	  and	  jurisdictional	  rights	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  confused.	  This	  
is	  because	  they	  are	  initially	  brought	  about	  in	  the	  same	  way:	  by	  first	  occupation.	  
Thus,	  Grotius	  starts	  the	  chapter	  by	  writing	  that:	  
Our	  Business	  then	  here,	  is	  to	  treat	  of	  taking	  Possession	  by	  Right	  of	  Prior	  
Occupation;	  which,	  since	  those	  early	  Times	  we	  just	  now	  mentioned,	  is	  the	  
only	  natural	  and	  primitive	  Manner	  of	  Acquisition.	  Now,	  as	  to	  what	  belongs	  
properly	  to	  no	  Body,	  there	  are	  two	  Things	  which	  one	  may	  take	  Possession	  of,	  
Jurisdiction,	  and	  the	  Right	  of	  Property,	  as	  it	  stands	  distinguished	  from	  
Jurisdiction	  ...	  Jurisdiction	  is	  commonly	  exercised	  on	  two	  Subjects,	  the	  one	  
primary,	  viz.	  Persons,	  and	  that	  alone	  is	  sometimes	  sufficient,	  as	  in	  an	  Army	  of	  
Men,	  Women,	  and	  Children,	  that	  are	  going	  in	  quest	  of	  some	  new	  Plantations;	  
the	  other	  secundary,	  viz.	  the	  Place,	  which	  is	  called	  Territory.	  But	  altho’	  
Jurisdiction	  and	  Property	  are	  usually	  acquired	  by	  one	  and	  the	  same	  Act,	  yet	  
are	  they	  in	  themselves	  really	  distinct	  (Grotius,	  2005	  [1625],	  bk.	  2,	  ch.	  3,	  s.4,	  
paras	  1–2,	  emphasis	  in	  original;	  see	  also	  bk.	  2,	  ch.	  3,	  s.	  13,	  para	  2).20	  
The	  distinction	  has	  important	  implications	  according	  to	  Grotius.	  For	  example,	  
foreign	  owners	  of	  land	  must	  accept	  the	  state’s	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  land	  ab	  initio.	  
And	  political	  authority	  cannot	  entitle	  the	  sovereign	  to	  expropriate	  his	  subjects.	  But	  
Grotius	  was	  also	  concerned	  about	  arcifinious	  lands	  –	  places	  with	  natural	  boundaries	  
–	  which	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  property-­‐based	  theories	  of	  territory.	  Suppose,	  writes	  
Grotius,	  that	  the	  banks	  of	  a	  river	  belong	  to	  different	  countries,	  and	  the	  river	  
gradually	  shifts	  into	  the	  territory	  of	  one.	  Since	  rivers	  in	  general	  belong	  to	  whoever	  
owns	  both	  banks,	  it	  would	  follow	  if	  jurisdiction	  were	  based	  on	  property	  that	  when	  
the	  river	  shifts	  far	  enough	  into	  the	  land	  possessed	  by	  one	  country,	  it	  would	  come	  to	  
lie	  within	  its	  jurisdiction	  as	  well.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Instead,	  the	  territorial	  
boundary	  will	  shift	  along.	  Thus,	  territorial	  rights	  cannot	  be	  grounded	  in	  property	  
rights	  (Grotius,	  2005	  [1625],	  bk.	  2,	  ch.	  3,	  ss.16–7).	  
	   The	  distinction	  between	  property	  and	  jurisdiction	  also	  played	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  The	  Free	  Sea.	  Grotius	  there	  objected	  to	  the	  Portuguese	  denying	  the	  Dutch	  free	  
passage	  to	  trade	  in	  the	  East	  Indies.	  He	  argued	  that	  since	  no	  one	  can	  own	  the	  seas,	  
any	  defense	  of	  Portuguese	  political	  control	  over	  the	  high	  seas	  had	  to	  be	  based	  on	  
claims	  of	  jurisdiction.	  But	  the	  Portuguese	  could	  not	  claim	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  seas,	  
and	  so	  lacked	  the	  right	  to	  deny	  the	  Dutch	  free	  passage	  (Grotius,	  2004	  [1609],	  ch.	  
5).21	  
	   On	  the	  reading	  I	  have	  proposed,	  Locke	  accepted	  a	  similar	  distinction	  between	  
jurisdic-­‐	  tion	  and	  property	  and	  drew	  similar	  conclusions	  from	  this.	  Not	  only	  did	  
Locke	  also	  mention	  that	  foreign	  owners	  of	  land	  must	  accept	  the	  state’s	  jurisdiction	  
over	  the	  land,	  and	  that	  political	  authority	  cannot	  entitle	  the	  sovereign	  to	  expropriate	  
his	  subjects,	  he	  also	  agreed	  with	  Grotius	  that	  appropriation	  in	  the	  colonies	  was	  
separate	  from	  their	  political	  control.	  That	  is,	  both	  thought	  that	  unused	  lands	  
(including	  lands	  used	  by	  nomadic	  peoples)	  were	  not	  owned,	  but	  might	  nonetheless	  
fall	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  native	  peoples.	  Such	  lands	  could	  be	  settled	  and	  
appropriated	  by	  colonists,	  but	  not	  without	  deferring	  to	  local	  authorities	  (Tuck,	  
1999,	  p.	  176).	  
	   By	  contrast,	  Pufendorf	  (2005	  [1672],	  bk.	  IV,	  ch.	  5,	  paras	  5–9)	  had	  explicitly	  
rejected	  Grotius’	  views	  on	  territory.	  Pufendorf	  saw	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  as	  based	  
in	  property.	  On	  the	  proposed	  reading	  of	  Locke,	  then,	  he	  firmly	  sides	  with	  Grotius	  
and	  against	  Pufendorf	  concerning	  territory,	  while	  the	  standard	  reading	  inverts	  this	  
relation.	  This	  provides	  a	  contextual	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  proposed	  alternative	  
reading	  of	  Locke.	  It	  removes	  what	  would	  otherwise	  be	  an	  odd	  exception	  to	  the	  
general	  theme	  of	  Locke	  defending	  the	  views	  of	  Grotius	  against	  Pufendorf.22	  
	   This	  argument	  is	  bolstered	  by	  two	  further	  similarities.	  One	  concerns	  how	  
rights	  to	  jurisdiction	  are	  obtained.	  Grotius	  thought	  these	  came	  about	  in	  the	  same	  
manner	  as	  property	  rights:	  by	  first	  possession.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  
with	  appropriation.	  For	  a	  state	  to	  enjoy	  territorial	  rights,	  it	  must	  effectively	  exercise	  
political	  power	  within	  it:	  
Now	  the	  Jurisdiction	  or	  Sovereignty	  over	  a	  Part	  of	  the	  Sea	  is	  acquired,	  in	  my	  
Opinion,	  as	  all	  other	  Sorts	  of	  Jurisdiction;	  that	  is,	  as	  we	  said	  before,	  in	  Regard	  
to	  Persons,	  and	  in	  Regard	  to	  Territory.	  In	  Regard	  to	  Persons,	  as	  when	  a	  Fleet,	  
which	  is	  a	  Sea-­‐Army,	  is	  kept	  in	  any	  Part	  of	  the	  Sea:	  In	  Regard	  to	  Territory,	  as	  
when	  those	  that	  sail	  on	  the	  Coasts	  of	  a	  Country	  may	  be	  compelled	  from	  the	  
Land,	  for	  then	  it	  is	  just	  the	  same	  as	  if	  they	  were	  actually	  upon	  the	  Land	  
(Grotius,	  2005	  [1625],	  bk	  2,	  ch.	  3,	  s.	  13,	  para.	  2).	  
The	  proposed	  account	  of	  Locke	  on	  territory	  holds	  the	  same.	  Groups	  can	  obtain	  
territorial	  rights	  by	  occupying	  and	  stably	  exercising	  political	  power	  within	  an	  area.	  
	   The	  second	  similarity	  concerns	  the	  role	  of	  international	  treaties.	  Grotius	  
thought	  that	  where	  natural	  boundaries	  are	  absent,	  such	  as	  on	  the	  high	  seas,	  treaties	  
would	  demarcate	  the	  exact	  boundaries	  of	  territorial	  jurisdiction.	  Jurisdiction,	  
Grotius	  argued	  (and	  Locke	  agreed),	  is	  based	  on	  the	  natural	  executive	  right.	  And	  
since	  this	  right	  is	  held	  ‘not	  by	  any	  proper	  right	  but	  of	  the	  common	  right	  which	  also	  
other	  free	  nations	  have’,	  the	  seas	  are	  in	  principle	  under	  common	  jurisdiction	  
(Grotius,	  (2004	  [1609]),	  ch.	  V).	  However,	  by	  entering	  into	  international	  agreements,	  
countries	  could	  contract	  to	  forgo	  their	  freedom	  to	  exercise	  the	  executive	  right	  and	  
create	  zones	  of	  exclusive	  jurisdiction:	  
We	  recognize,	  however,	  that	  certain	  peoples	  have	  agreed	  that	  pirates	  
captured	  in	  this	  or	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  sea	  should	  come	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  
of	  this	  state	  or	  of	  that,	  and	  further	  that	  certain	  convenient	  limits	  of	  distinct	  
jurisdiction	  have	  been	  apportioned	  on	  the	  sea.	  Now,	  this	  agreement	  does	  
bind	  those	  who	  are	  parties	  to	  it,	  but	  it	  has	  no	  binding	  force	  on	  other	  nations,	  
nor	  does	  it	  make	  the	  delimited	  area	  of	  the	  sea	  the	  private	  property	  of	  any	  
one.	  It	  merely	  constitutes	  a	  personal	  right	  between	  contracting	  parties	  
(Grotius,	  (1916	  [1609],	  p.	  35).	  
Locke’s	  brief	  but	  repeated	  mentions	  of	  international	  treaties	  play	  the	  same	  role	  in	  
his	  theory	  of	  territory.	  They	  demarcate	  exclusive	  spheres	  of	  political	  authority	  
because	  sovereigns	  have	  become	  contractually	  obligated	  to	  respect	  them	  as	  such.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
Locke’s	  theory	  of	  territorial	  rights	  is	  twofold.	  (1)	  States	  can	  gain	  the	  right	  to	  rule	  
over	  a	  territory	  by	  exercising	  justified	  political	  power	  within	  it.	  When	  they	  do,	  the	  
people	  who	  remain	  in	  these	  areas	  thereby	  give	  them	  their	  tacit	  consent.	  (2)	  The	  
boundaries	  of	  these	  areas	  are	  settled	  primarily	  by	  international	  treaties.	  Through	  
entering	  into	  such	  treaties,	  sovereigns	  obligate	  themselves	  to	  refrain	  from	  
exercising	  political	  power	  within	  each	  other’s	  territories.	  
	   In	  closing,	  I	  will	  address	  two	  final	  questions	  to	  which	  this	  argument	  might	  
give	  rise.	  First,	  if	  I	  am	  right,	  why	  have	  so	  many	  misread	  Locke	  on	  this	  topic?	  Second,	  
how	  does	  this	  reading	  of	  Locke	  affect	  the	  role	  his	  thought	  plays	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  political	  philosophy?	  
	   About	  the	  first	  question	  one	  can	  only	  speculate.	  But	  there	  are	  a	  few	  
reasonable	  explanations.	  One	  is	  that	  attention	  to	  Locke’s	  views	  on	  territory	  is	  a	  
relatively	  recent	  phenomenon.	  Yet	  few	  still	  carefully	  study	  Locke’s	  critique	  of	  Filmer	  
in	  the	  First	  Treatise,	  a	  central	  piece	  of	  evidence	  against	  the	  standard	  view.	  Sections	  I,	  
41–3	  still	  draw	  attention,	  but	  are	  mainly	  read	  for	  their	  remarks	  on	  distributive	  
justice	  (the	  so-­‐called	  charity	  proviso),	  not	  authority.	  
	   More	  importantly,	  many	  now	  insist	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  state	  authority	  
and	  territorial	  rights.	  The	  latter,	  they	  argue,	  do	  not	  follow	  from	  the	  former.	  But	  for	  
Locke	  this	  is	  not	  a	  meaningful	  distinction.	  The	  freedom	  one	  lacks	  in	  an	  existing	  state	  
is	  the	  same	  as	  one	  lacks	  when	  a	  state	  is	  first	  created	  –	  to	  remain	  in	  the	  area	  yet	  
escape	  political	  authority.	  And	  since	  Locke	  had	  no	  qualms	  about	  this	  lack	  of	  freedom	  
once	  states	  exist,	  why	  think	  he	  had	  qualms	  about	  it	  when	  states	  were	  first	  created?	  
As	  a	  result,	  modern	  audiences	  might	  be	  looking	  in	  Locke	  for	  something	  that	  is	  not	  
there.	  
	   This	  theory	  of	  territory	  adds,	  I	  believe,	  to	  Locke’s	  significance	  as	  a	  liberal	  
thinker.	  Locke’s	  work	  appears	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  nature	  of	  
sovereignty	  and	  jurisdiction	  was	  perceived.	  And	  while	  Grotius	  first	  introduced	  the	  
conceptual	  distinction	  between	  jurisdiction	  and	  property,	  it	  was	  Locke	  who	  saw	  its	  
true	  importance.	  Far	  from	  being	  the	  source	  of	  rightful	  government,	  he	  argued,	  
individual	  property	  rights	  pose	  necessary	  limits	  to	  it.	  Citizens	  retain	  their	  natural	  
rights,	  including	  their	  property	  rights,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  government	  is	  to	  render	  them	  
secure	  and	  determinate.	  
	   In	  the	  end,	  then,	  Locke	  may	  have	  been	  right	  that	  separating	  one’s	  theory	  of	  
legitimate	  authority	  from	  one’s	  theory	  of	  territory	  is	  superfluous.	  Locke	  saw	  that	  the	  
powers	  of	  government	  are	  based	  on	  the	  natural	  executive	  rights	  of	  its	  subjects.	  But	  
the	  executive	  right	  is	  neither	  a	  part	  of	  nor	  limited	  by	  people’s	  property	  rights.	  Thus,	  
the	  conditions	  of	  justified	  government	  over	  people	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  supplemented	  
with	  separate	  conditions	  of	  justified	  government	  over	  land.	  Territorial	  rights,	  Locke	  
teaches	  us,	  are	  simply	  jurisdictional	  rights.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes	  
For	  very	  helpful	  comments	  on	  earlier	  versions	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Hugh	  Breakey,	  
Bill	  Edmundson,	  Govert	  den	  Hartogh,	  Dan	  Layman,	  Massimo	  Renzo,	  John	  Simmons,	  
Matt	  Smith	  and	  Annie	  Stilz.	  
	  
1	  See,	  e.g.,	  Brilmayer,	  1989;	  Buchanan,	  2003;	  Morris,	  2002,	  pp.	  262–5.	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  for	  this	  reason	  the	  
submission	  of	  property	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  territorial	  rights.	  I	  have	  no	  
quarrel	  with	  this.	  My	  point	  here	  is	  simply	  this:	  whatever	  other	  conditions	  might	  be	  
in	  place,	  the	  submission	  of	  property	  does	  nothing	  to	  further	  the	  Lockean	  case	  for	  
territorial	  rights.	  
10	  Cited	  in	  Tully,	  1980,	  p.	  56.	  
11	  In	  the	  Second	  Treatise,	  Locke	  adds	  a	  third	  argument:	  property	  rights	  do	  not	  
provide	  rights	  over	  persons,	  but	  over	  land.	  And	  	  jurisdiction	  requires	  rights	  over	  
persons.	  See	  II,	  120,	  121,	  139,	  180,	  182.	  
12	  I	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  reviewer	  for	  pressing	  me	  on	  this	  point.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  John	  Simmons	  has	  suggested	  to	  me	  that	  Locke’s	  point	  here	  is	  merely	  that	  consent	  
must	  be	  freely	  given,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  precluded	  	  by	  Adam’s	  ownership	  of	  the	  entire	  
earth.	  However,	  interpretative	  charity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  dialectic	  of	  the	  First	  Treatise	  
suggests	  otherwise.	  Locke’s	  strategy	  is	  to	  consider	  various	  interpretations	  of	  
Filmer’s	  position,	  and	  show	  that	  none	  is	  successful.	  In	  I,	  41–3	  Locke	  discusses	  what	  
he	  thinks	  would	  be	  the	  strongest	  possible	  case	  Filmer	  might	  make	  for	  deriving	  
sovereignty	  from	  property	  –	  not	  one	  that	  he	  can	  easily	  knock	  down	  because	  of	  a	  
peculiarity	  about	  Adam’s	  position	  as	  the	  sole	  owner	  of	  the	  earth.	  Moreover,	  
stressing	  the	  voluntariness	  conditions	  for	  valid	  consent	  is	  a	  risky	  strategy	  for	  any	  
interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  thought	  (if	  not	  for	  modern	  uses	  of	  it).	  For	  such	  conditions	  
threaten	  not	  just	  my	  interpretation	  of	  Locke’s	  views	  on	  territory	  but	  the	  entire	  
doctrine	  of	  tacit	  consent.	  
14	  See	  also	  II,	  97,	  99.	  
15	  See	  also	  II,	  94,	  105,	  106,	  107,	  112.	  These	  passages	  are	  often	  ignored	  or	  
downplayed,	  leading	  authors	  to	  assert	  (falsely)	  that,	  for	  	  Locke,	  express	  consent	  is	  
necessary	  at	  the	  founding	  of	  a	  commonwealth.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Franklin,	  1996,	  p.	  414.	  One	  
notable	  exception	  	  is	  Simmons,	  1998.	  
16	  The	  latter	  seems	  suggested	  by	  Simmons	  (2001,	  pp.	  314–5).	  Thanks	  to	  John	  
Simmons	  and	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pushing	  me	  	  on	  this.	  
17	  Locke	  does	  say	  that	  the	  commons	  are	  collectively	  owned	  by	  the	  community	  (see	  
also	  II,	  35).	  But	  this	  is	  not	  denied	  by	  the	  reading	  	  proposed	  here.	  All	  it	  denies	  is	  that	  
this	  grounds	  their	  territorial	  rights.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Tully	  even	  writes	  that	  Locke’s	  Second	  Treatise	  ‘can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  defence	  of	  Grotius’	  
conclusions	  against	  the	  attacks	  leveled	  at	  them	  	  by	  Pufendorf’	  (Tully,	  1980,	  p.	  178).	  
19	  Locke	  (1997	  [1703],	  s.186)	  recommends	  the	  works	  of	  Grotius	  and	  Pufendorf	  
among	  those	  that	  are	  indispensable	  to	  the	  education	  	  of	  a	  gentleman.	  
20	  It	  is	  true	  that	  Grotius	  also	  talks	  of	  land	  as	  ‘the	  general	  Property	  of	  the	  State’	  (e.g.	  
bk.	  2,	  ch.	  3,	  s.29,	  para.	  3).	  But	  in	  these	  passages	  	  Grotius	  is	  quite	  clearly	  talking	  of	  
private	  property.	  Private	  property,	  Grotius	  thought,	  could	  be	  created	  either	  by	  
individual	  appropriation	  (occupation)	  or	  by	  ‘initial	  division’,	  where	  a	  community	  in	  
a	  consensual	  manner	  collectively	  divided	  the	  land.	  In	  those	  cases,	  and	  only	  in	  the	  
sense	  relevant	  to	  private	  ownership,	  does	  Grotius	  refer	  to	  the	  state	  or	  nation	  as	  
owning	  land.	  I	  thank	  Annie	  Stilz	  for	  suggesting	  this	  objection	  to	  me.	  
21	  Tuck	  (1999,	  p.	  91)	  labels	  the	  passage	  where	  Grotius	  develops	  this	  argument	  as	  the	  
‘key	  passage’	  of	  The	  Free	  Sea.	  
22	  Tuck	  (1999,	  pp.	  175–81)	  sees	  Locke’s	  views	  on	  territory	  as	  just	  such	  an	  anomaly.	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